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By reallocating aid to where it is needed most and where a productive use is most 
likely, donors could help alleviate poverty in developing countries. The rhetoric of 
donors suggests that this insight has increasingly shaped the allocation of aid. 
However, we find little evidence supporting the view that the targeting of aid has 
improved significantly. Most donors provide higher aid to relatively poor countries, 
but so far the fight against poverty has not resulted in a stronger focus on recipient 
countries with particularly high incidence of absolute poverty. Many donors failed to 
direct aid predominantly to where local conditions were conducive to a productive use 
of inflows. The response of donors to changing institutional and policy conditions in 
recipient countries turns out to be fairly weak. In particular, we reject the proposition 
that multilateral donor institutions provide better targeted aid than bilateral donors. 
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Since the publication of the World Bank study “Assessing Aid: What Works, What 
Doesn’t, and Why” in 1998, a broad consensus has emerged that the economic effects 
of external aid in recipient countries could be enhanced if aid flows were better 
targeted to poor countries which pursue development-friendly economic policies. 
Accordingly, the challenge for bilateral donors and multilateral donor institutions is 
not only to provide more aid but also to increase the effectiveness of a given amount of 
aid. By reallocating aid to where poverty-related needs are greatest and where a 
productive use is most likely, donors could improve the much criticized record of aid 
in the past and contribute to higher income growth and the alleviation of absolute 
poverty in developing countries. 
Recent donor initiatives appear to be built on this insight. For example, President 
Bush, in his address delivered at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, outlined a new approach of the United States to 
foreign aid. President Bush announced to increase US aid by 50 percent, but 
“exclusively for countries with good governance, investing in health and education and 
encouraging economic freedom” (quoted from The Economist 2002: 73). 
Moreover, important donors such as the World Bank claim that the insights on how to 
render aid more effective have already been translated into practical aid policies so 
that the targeting of aid to poor countries offering favourable local conditions has 
improved considerably (World Bank 2002). However, it is far from obvious whether 
such claims are well founded. An earlier evaluation of World Bank aid questioned this  
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institution’s own favourable assessment (Nunnenkamp 2002a). The present paper 
takes a broader perspective: We analyse the actual behaviour of all major donors since 
the early 1980s. In particular, we assess whether multilateral donor institutions provide 
more efficient aid than bilateral donors, and whether aid has become more targeted 
over time. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we summarize the recent literature on the 
effectiveness of aid. Second, we deal with data problems and describe how we try to 
overcome some of the pitfalls in using aid data. Third, we raise several questions 
related to the efficiency of aid allocation. After evaluating whether aid has been 
targeted to poor countries and to where local conditions are relatively favourable, we 
combine these two criteria that, according to the calls for more effective aid, should 
guide the allocation of aid. Finally, we assess whether bilateral donors and multilateral 
institutions have responded appropriately to changes  in local conditions, e.g. by 
increasing aid to countries whose policy and institutional reforms provided better 
chances for aid being effective. 
We conclude with a summary of major findings. All in all, we find little evidence 
supporting the view that foreign aid is well targeted. Multilateral institutions and most 
bilateral donors do provide more aid to countries with relatively low per-capita income 
than to richer countries, but the fight against absolute poverty has not resulted in more 
focussed aid so far. Many donors have failed to direct aid predominantly to where 
local conditions rendered it more likely that aid could be used productively. The 
response of donors to changing institutional and policy conditions in recipient  
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countries is shown to be fairly weak. In particular, we reject the proposition that 
multilateral institutions provide better targeted aid than bilateral donors. 
Where Do We Stand? 
Industrialized countries grant aid to developing countries for a wide variety of reasons. 
Apart from satisfying humanitarian needs in recipient countries and fostering the 
recipients’ economic development, Schraeder et al. (1998) list several other 
determinants of bilateral aid considered important in the literature: strategic 
considerations, i.e., aid being used as a tool to enhance the national security of donors; 
the contribution of aid to the donor’s economy, notably the promotion of exports of 
the donor country to the recipient country; colonial heritage and the ensuing cultural 
similarity of former colonial powers and their former colonies; as well as the 
ideological and political stance of developing countries, i.e., aid being used to support 
recipients who share the ideological beliefs and contribute to the political ends of 
donors. 
Hence, it may be hardly surprising that various studies, especially research conducted 
in the 1970s and 1980s, found that bilateral donors largely pursue their own interests 
when allocating aid across recipients and “that developmental or humanitarian 
concerns, including the reduction of poverty, receive a relatively low or even zero 
weight in this process” (McGillivray 2003: 7).
1 Some critics even argued that aid was 
                                              
1   See also the literature given there.  
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counterproductive from a developmental point of view.
2 For example, Boone (1996) 
found that aid did not add to investment in developing countries, nor benefited the 
poor, but it did increase the size of government. Perverse incentive effects were also 
stressed by Easterly (2001), who argued that recipients are tempted to reduce their own 
efforts at economic development as long as aid is granted to close so-called financing 
gaps. Langhammer (2004) pointed to the possibility that rising aid inflows adversely 
affect the quality of economic policy in recipient countries, e.g., by inducing wasteful 
spending and encouraging rent-seeking. Weder (2000: 297) as well as Nunnenkamp 
(2002b: 8) showed that the correlation between aid inflows in terms of per capita of 
the recipient countries’ population and the growth rate of per-capita income in these 
countries was totally insignificant for a large sample of developing countries. 
The latter finding does not mean, however, that “foreign aid has not been effective 
under certain circumstances” (Weder 2000: 297). It rather suggests that there have 
been as many failures as successes. As a matter of fact, the debate has shifted to the 
question under which conditions aid could achieve “the ultimate objective of … 
poverty reduction or, more broadly, the promotion of human well-being” (McGillivray 
2003: 24). Influential contributions to this debate, notably World Bank (1998), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) as well as Collier and Dollar (2001), suggested that the 
effectiveness of aid, in terms of promoting income growth and alleviating absolute 
poverty in the recipient countries, could be greatly improved if aid was directed 
                                              
2   The late Lord Bauer offered a particularly forceful critique of foreign aid (Bauer 1972).  
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primarily to poor countries pursuing development friendly economic policies. This 
view has been challenged from different angles:
3 
•  Apart from the income status of recipients and the quality of their policies, the 
effectiveness of aid is supposed to depend on additional factors. For example, 
aid may help contain the social costs of external shocks in countries with high 
vulnerability to natural disasters and terms-of-trade losses (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet 2001). Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003) argue that aid could be effective 
under conditions of post-conflict reconstruction. 
•  Roland-Holst and Tarp (2002: 35) criticize that the effectiveness debate has 
been confined by an “excessive preoccupation with macro performance criteria” 
and largely ignored that “poverty and its attendant experiences are 
microeconomic phenomena.” 
•  According to Ram (2003: 106), the debate suffers from paying insufficient 
attention to the “substantial differences between bilateral and multilateral aid in 
terms of donor motives, character of and conditionalities associated with the 
aid.” Likewise, Harms and Lutz (2004) call for a disaggregated analysis of 
different types of aid. 
•  Langhammer (2004) considers it unreasonable to assume that the reallocation of 
aid in favour of countries with good policies does not deteriorate the quality of 
these policies. 
                                              
3   For a recent survey, see Harms and Lutz (2004).  
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These extensions and qualifications notwithstanding, it is by now widely accepted that, 
for aid to support economic development, (i) recipients must have in place 
development friendly governance and institutional structures as well as sound 
economic policies, and (ii) donors need to be selective in allocating aid. The most 
frequently mentioned selection criteria are: the level of per-capita income and the 
degree of absolute poverty in recipient countries and their development performance 
(Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003: 7). According to Collier and Dollar (2001: 1787-8), 
whose research contributed considerably to the recently emerged consensus, “the 
interaction of aid and policy is good for growth, so that aid enhances the growth effect 
of policy and good policy increases the growth effect of aid.” It follows that a poverty-
efficient aid allocation should target low-income countries, and among them favour 
countries with a better policy. 
This raises the question, on which we concentrate in the following, whether bilateral 
donors and multilateral institutions have adjusted their aid allocation accordingly. 
Policy statements by several donors suggest that this has been the case. Most 
prominently, the United States announced at the UN Conference on Financing for 
Development that the principle of selectivity would clearly guide the allocation of US 
aid. The so-called Millennium Challenge Account envisages that good governance and 
market friendly economic policies will be required for developing countries to receive 
US aid (Clemens and Radelet 2003). OECD representatives claim that the growing 
academic consensus has already guided cross-country allocation decisions of  
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multilateral and bilateral donors (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003: 7).
4 McGillivray 
refers to a recent survey of ten donors to make the point that developmental criteria are 
receiving higher priority in aid allocation; multilateral institutions, in particular, are 
said to have a clearer developmental focus (McGillivray 2003: 28). The favourable 
perception of multilateral aid is supported by a recent World Bank study; the study 
contends that the allocation of World Bank aid “has improved dramatically in recent 
years” (World Bank 2002: 69). 
It would not be for the first time that words are in conflict with deeds.
5 Alesina and 
Weder (2002: 1136) point to the rhetoric of donors that aid rewards efficient and 
honest governments. These authors apply various indicators of corruption in recipient 
countries and come to the conclusion: “Our vast exploration of the data never 
uncovered any even weak evidence of a negative effect of corruption on received 
foreign aid.” The results of an earlier comparison of US, Japanese, French and 
Swedish aid to African countries by Schraeder et al. (1998: 319) “clearly reject the 
rhetorical statements of policymakers within the industrialized North who publicly 
assert that foreign aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy.” Even for Sweden these 
authors find that words deviated considerably from deeds: Aid by this donor is widely 
recognized as being guided by humanitarian need of recipients, whereas Schraeder et 
                                              
4   Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003: 10) reckon: “After the cold war, donors have given more 
emphasis to development criteria than previously, including selectivity according to both 
poverty needs and policy performance.” 
5   Breuning (1995) entitled her study “Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and 
Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.”  
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al. (1998) reveal that the allocation of Swedish aid was increasingly shaped by vocal 
domestic interests demanding a positive linkage between aid and the promotion of 
Swedish exports.
6 Alesina and Dollar (2000) analyse the allocation of aid by bilateral 
donors by applying panel estimates. They consider various variables as possible 
determinants of aid, including the income status and size of recipient countries, their 
openness to trade, the political regime and civil liberties, as well as colonial ties and 
the voting behaviour of recipients in the United Nations. The major result of this 
exercise is that foreign aid was dictated as much by political and strategic 
considerations as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. 
Donors claiming that the allocation of aid has improved recently may object that these 
studies portray a picture that no longer applies. That is why we focus on the most 
recent past in the subsequent analysis. In any case, there is sufficient reason to be 
sceptical whether fine words have been translated into noble deeds. A recent 
evaluation of World Bank aid by Nunnenkamp (2002a) argues that the World Bank’s 
success story rests on extremely weak foundations. According to a simple regression 
analysis, the allocation of World Bank aid did not improve in the course of the 1990s. 
Moreover, the claim that poor countries with good policies received much higher per-
capita aid than less needy and deserving countries is found unjustified once two 
outliers with extremely high per-capita aid (Cape Verde and Honduras) are excluded 
from the sample. Langhammer (2004) questions that the end of the Cold War has 
                                              
6  Grilli and Riess (1992: 214) stress the commercial interests of donor countries in their 
analysis of EC aid to associated developing countries. However, these authors note a shift 
in bilateral EC aid policies towards “a more need-oriented type of assistance” in the 1980s.  
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rendered aid allocation more efficient. Especially after September 11, 2001, “the 
assumption that aid allocation for strategic reasons has become an issue of the past 
seems naïve” (Langhammer 2004: 90).
7 
Against this backdrop, we suspect that the starting point of Schraeder et al. (1998), 
namely that critical analyses of aid allocation based on comprehensive empirical 
evidence are rare, retains its validity. On the one hand, the results of earlier studies 
may no longer apply. The analysis of Schraeder et al. (1998) covers only the 1980s, 
and the data used in Alesina and Dollar (2000) as well as Alesina and Weder (2002) do 
not extend beyond 1995. Moreover, previous assessments are mostly restricted to 
bilateral aid
8, and the recent evaluation of Nunnenkamp (2002a) is confined to World 
Bank aid. On the other hand, “a simple inspection of aid statistics”, which according to 
McGillivray (2003: 27) reveals a slight upward trend in aid shares directed to low-
income countries, appears to be insufficient to prove that the allocative behaviour of 
donors has shifted away from non-developmental criteria. As we show in the next 
section, a simple inspection may lead to biased results. 
The subsequent analysis aims at overcoming these shortcomings. We cover aid flows 
in 1981-2002, with a focus on the recent past. The behaviour of bilateral donors is 
compared with the behaviour of multilateral institutions, in order to check the 
                                              
7   On the occasion of the spring meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in 2004, The 
Economist (2004) noted that “aid was flowing a little more generously, but a lot more 
strategically.” 
8  For example, Breuning (1995) and Schraeder et al. (1998) consider just three and four 
bilateral donors, respectively.  
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widespread belief that the latter have a stronger developmental focus.
9 Moreover, we 
figure out whether the allocation of aid differs significantly between the nine most 
important bilateral donors (United States, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark). We refer to two indicators of 
humanitarian need for foreign aid: the per-capita income of recipient countries and the 
incidence of absolute poverty in these countries. In this way, we take into account that 
both donors and recipients have announced to attach priority to the eradication of 
absolute poverty. Finally, we apply alternative measures reflecting the local conditions 
for aid to be used productively in the recipient countries. In addition to drawing on the 
limited evidence available from the World Bank on its Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), we consider several institutional and policy-related variables as 
possible determinants of the allocation of aid across a large number of developing 
countries. 
Some Pitfalls in Using Aid Statistics 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides the most frequently 
used statistics on aid granted by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions to a large 
number of recipient countries. For example, the important contribution by Alesina and 
                                              
9 It may be argued that political and economic self-interests of donors figure more 
prominently in the utility functions of bilateral donors. However, we do not attempt to 
specify and estimate the utility functions of bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. 
Rather, the role of political and economic self-interests is assessed only indirectly by 
comparing the extent to which developmental criteria have shaped the allocation of 
bilateral and multilateral aid, respectively.  
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Dollar (2000) refers to this standard source. As a matter of fact, a first impression on 
whether aid has increasingly been targeted to poor recipient countries is quite easy to 
get from DAC statistics since this source also provides a classification of recipient 
countries into different income categories. As will be shown in the following, 
however, the interpretation of these data is subject to various problems. 
In Table 1, we present the development of net disbursements of aid by bilateral DAC 
donors as well as multilateral institutions granted to the group of recipients classified 
as least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries by the DAC. Aid 
to these recipients is given as the share in total aid to all recipients by bilateral and 
multilateral donors, respectively. The distribution of aid portrayed in Table 1 may be 
read as supporting some widely held beliefs: 
•  First of all, multilateral aid appears to be better targeted to countries with relatively 
low per-capita income than aid of all bilateral donors taken together. 
•  At the same time, the targeting of aid differs widely across bilateral donors. 
•  It is consistent with conventional wisdom that the Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands reported the highest share of aid directed to countries with relatively 
low per-capita income until the early 1990s. However, this was no longer true in 
the more recent past. 
•  The focus on low-income countries is shown to be weakest for US aid, which 
invites the conclusion that political and strategic interests dominate the allocation 
of US aid.  
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•  The share of Japanese aid accounted for by low-income recipients appears to be 
surprisingly high throughout the period under consideration. However, the high 
share is largely due to aid given to “other low-income countries”, notably China, 
Indonesia and Vietnam; Japan’s aid to LDCs accounted for just 13.5 percent of 
total aid in 1999–2002. 
Table 1 —  Share of Least Developed Countries and Other Low-income Countries (DAC 
classification) in Total Aid by Bilateral and Multilateral Donors, 1981–2002 
(percent) 
 1981–1986  1987–1992  1993–1998  1999–2002 
All DAC donors  43.8  45.8  44.5  45.2 
United States  23.7  21.3  22.3  30.5 
Japan 53.3  55.3  56.3  57.8 
France 43.5  49.2  43.2  42.5 
Germany 51.0  46.0  51.3  44.9 
United Kingdom  58.9  61.1  54.5  54.3 
Netherlands 60.2  57.4 39.9  45.8 
Sweden 67.3  57.4  46.1  40.0 
Norway 70.2  65.9  53.7  44.4 
Denmark 79.7  66.0  56.9  55.7 
Multilateral donors  69.5  71.9  66.4  62.6 
Source: OECD  (2004). 
The targeting of aid to low-income countries seems to have become weaker over time 
for many bilateral donors as well as for multilateral donor institutions. Taking into 
consideration that all LDCs plus other low-income countries account for 72 out of the 
174 aid recipients listed in the DAC statistics,
10 and for about 60 percent of the world’s 
                                              
10  The total of 174 aid recipients excludes 12 transition countries in Central/Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union; see below on Part II of the DAC statistics.  
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population, it even appears to be questionable whether donors really treated these 
countries more favourably than more advanced countries.  
However, the first impression on the allocation of aid, as presented in Table 1 on the 
basis of official DAC data, may be misleading for various reasons. This standard 
source of aid flows does not capture important aspects of the much debated efficiency 
of aid. For example, the data comprise both emergency relief and “regular” aid. Tied 
aid is included even though it is less useful for recipients than untied aid. The Centre 
for Global Development discounts tied aid by 20 percent (The Economist 2003). 
Moreover, the commonly used net disbursements of aid comprise loans as well as 
outright grants by donors; notwithstanding the DAC criterion that loans must have a 
minimum grant element of 25 percent, the reported aid flows cover transfers that are 
concessional to a widely different degree.
11 
While these flaws are difficult to overcome when analysing the distribution of aid by 
various donors to a large sample of recipient countries, other data problems can and 
should be taken into account. The distribution of aid in the recent past, on which we 
concentrate in the following, depends on the treatment of so-called Part II countries 
(DAC 2004). The DAC has separated this group comprising “more advanced 
developing countries and territories (MADCT)” plus a dozen relatively advanced 
transition countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from the 
main list of aid recipients (Part I) since 1993: 
                                              
11   Langhammer (2004: 82) notes that reported aid flows tend to overstate the true grant 
content by 25–30 percent.  
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•  Some MADCT that have been shifted from the main list to Part II are major aid 
recipients. Israel is the most prominent case in point; in 1993–1998, for example, 
Israel represented by far the most important recipient of US aid, accounting for 
more than 18 percent of total US aid. At the same time, French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia (which have also been shifted to Part II) each accounted for almost 7 
percent of French aid. Ignoring the shift of MADCT to Part II may result in 
seriously distorted results. In the case of France, the share of 42.5 percent of aid 
directed to low-income countries, reported in Table 1, declines to 36.2 percent if 
aid to MADCT in Part II is taken into account. This is why we include aid to 
MADCT in the subsequent analysis. 
•  By contrast, transition countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union which are now listed in Part II but did not appear on the main list of aid 
recipients before, are excluded from the subsequent analysis. This seems 
appropriate since our focus is on aid to developing countries, and we rely on data 
for the period 1981–2002 in some steps of our analysis. Yet, when discussing aid 
shares of developing country groups, it should be kept in mind that shares reported 
since the early 1990s would have to be adjusted downwards if aid flows to 
relatively advanced transition countries were included. This refers to multilateral 
donor institutions, in particular, who directed 17 percent of their overall aid in 
1999–2002 to transition countries listed in Part II; for all bilateral donors taken 
together, the corresponding share was just 7.5 percent.  
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Another data issue concerns “unallocated aid”. The distribution of aid between 
different income groups may be blurred since unallocated aid constitutes a significant 
and rising share of total aid, especially for several bilateral donors. For instance, 
unallocated aid rose from 15 percent in 1981–1986 to 36 percent in 1999–2002 for the 
United States, and from 23 percent to 40 percent for Sweden. This in itself may raise 
important questions about the efficiency of aid. Unallocated aid not only comprises 
items such as research performed in the donor country for the benefit of developing 
countries but also administrative costs, which are mainly incurred in the donor country 
(DAC 2004: 9). It is impossible to decide, however, which factor bears major 
responsibility for the rise in unallocated aid by bilateral donors. Hence, the analysis of 
aid shares in the next sections is based on adjusted totals which exclude unallocated 
amounts. 
Finally, the distribution of aid between different income groups as given in the DAC 
statistics is flawed since the same income classification of recipients is applied over 
the whole period under consideration. This means that a recipient country listed as 
especially poor or relatively advanced, on the basis of per-capita income data for 1998, 
is implicitly assumed to have been in the same category almost 20 years before. As 
shown below, this assumption is highly unrealistic. Therefore, we reclassify recipient 
countries according to their status in terms of per-capita income (as well as the 
incidence of absolute poverty) at the beginning of each sub-period. This procedure has 
as a consequence that the aid share of specific income groups may vary considerably 
over time, especially when important recipients cross the line from one income group  
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to another and donors do not adjust their aid allocation accordingly. 
In addition to the – adjusted – share analysis just described, we calculate aid flows in 
terms of per capita of the recipient countries’ population. This alternative measure is 
required to account for the fact that the development of aid shares is dominated by 
some important recipients of aid in absolute terms, e.g., large countries such as China 
and India. This is not to ignore that the comparison of aid in per-capita terms has its 
own problems. As shown in Nunnenkamp (2002a), some outliers may result in a 
completely misleading picture on whether donors have targeted poor countries or 
countries with favourable local conditions for aid being used productively. We account 
for this possibility by (i) presenting the median of per-capita aid for specific country 
groups in addition to the average, and (ii) running (non-parametric) Spearman rank 
correlations in addition to Pearson correlations. 
Is Aid Targeted to Poor Countries? 
In the first step of this section, we analyse the poverty orientation of bilateral donors 
and multilateral institutions, by calculating aid shares and accounting for the 
procedural issues raised before. We use two measures to assess whether aid was 
targeted to countries in particular need of aid: the per-capita income (US$ in terms of 
PPP) at the beginning of the sub-periods considered and the percentage of the recipient 
countries’ population living on less than one dollar per day. The second measure 
reflects the incidence of absolute poverty. In contrast to earlier studies such as Alesina 
and Dollar (2000), we account for absolute poverty, in addition to per-capita income,  
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as poverty eradication has become a most important objective which the donor 
community would like to help achieve.
12 The measure of absolute poverty is taken 
from Chen and Ravallion (2004) and the online database provided by these authors 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp). For both measures we divide 
the sample countries for which the relevant data are available into quartiles and 
present, in Table 2 and Annex Table 1, the aid shares of the poorest quartile and the 
poorer half of the sample. 
The evidence for multilateral institutions and all bilateral donors taken together does 
not support claims that aid has become more focussed on countries with low per-capita 
income and high incidence of absolute poverty. This is not to ignore that multilateral 
institutions directed about four fifths of their aid to countries whose per-capita income 
was below the median, and more than two thirds to countries where the incidence of 
absolute poverty was above the median.
13 Furthermore, multilateral aid appears to be 
better targeted than bilateral aid throughout the period 1981–2002 and in all respects, 
i.e., independently of whether we consider the poorer half of the sample or the poorest 
quartile, or whether per-capita income or absolute poverty is taken as an indicator of 
                                              
12  The so-called Millennium Development Goals (http://www.developmentgoals.org/) as well 
as the outcome of the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey are 
clear indications to this effect (UN 2002). 
13  It has to be recalled that the totals on the basis of which we calculate shares do not include 
“unallocated aid”,  aid to countries for which income or poverty data are lacking and aid to 




   
need. Typically, however, poor recipients received a lower share of multilateral aid in 
the most recent sub-period (1999–2002) than in the more distant past.  
Table 2 —  Share  of  Low-income  Countriesa in Total Aid by Bilateral and Multilateral 
Donors,b 1981–2002 (percent) 
Donors   Groups of 
recipients  1981–1986 1987–1992 1993–1998 1999–2002 
All DAC donors  poorest quartile  35.6  31.2  28.5  27.6 
  poor half  68.2  71.3  72.9  67.0 
United States  poorest quartile  18.1  12.5  18.0  22.3 
  poor half  52.0  57.9  54.1  52.0 
Japan  poorest  quartile 38.3 27.9 15.3 12.6 
  poor half  71.0  67.5  73.1  63.1 
France poorest  quartile 43.9 38.7 32.3 34.1 
  poor half  77.3  80.9  75.0  70.8 
Germany  poorest  quartile 38.1 28.8 30.9 32.5 
  poor half  68.5  68.5  78.5  64.3 
United Kingdom  poorest quartile  61.1  52.1  47.9  45.7 
  poor half  85.3  91.4  84.0  83.1 
Netherlands  poorest  quartile 55.0 40.2 51.5 43.6 
  poor half  83.2  83.2  77.8  82.1 
Sweden  poorest  quartile 68.2 53.8 46.3 43.4 
  poor half  87.9  86.9  79.0  80.3 
Norway  poorest  quartile 72.6 57.2 60.9 49.8 
  poor half  88.0  86.7  84.8  78.9 
Denmark  poorest  quartile 75.9 56.2 55.8 48.8 
  poor half  95.9  92.7  88.8  84.6 
        
        
Multilateral donors  poorest quartile  63.8  51.4  40.9  36.6 
  poor half  85.9  89.8  85.2  78.7 
aCountry classification according to per-capita income (US$ in terms of PPP) at the beginning of the respective 
period. – bAid granted to all countries with data on per-capita income in the respective period = 100. Aid 
reported as unallocated in the source not included in totals. 
Source: OECD (2004); World Bank (2004).  
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The latter observation applies to the poorest quartile in particular, whose share in 
multilateral aid decreased to 36–38 percent. The poverty focus of multilateral 
institutions weakened most considerably when the poorest quartile is defined in terms 
of per-capita income. In 1999–2002, this quartile received less multilateral aid than the 
next quartile with higher per-capita (though still below the median). This is mainly 
because some large countries, notably China, India and Pakistan, continued to be 
among the most important recipients of aid even though they recorded relatively high 
income growth and, thus, no longer belonged to the poorest quartile.
14 In other words, 
multilateral institutions were rather hesitant to adjust the allocation of aid to the 
changing income status of recipients.
15 
The targeting of bilateral aid by all DAC donors to the poorest quartile of recipients 
was weak throughout 1981–2002. Most recently, the poorest quartile received just 
slightly more than a quarter of bilateral aid. Bilateral aid was rather biased towards 
countries close to the median. This is most evident when recipients are classified 
according to absolute poverty. The two quartiles just above and below the median each 
accounted for a higher share in total bilateral aid than the poorest quartile in 1999-
2002. At the same time, Table 2 and Annex Table 1 underscore that there are 
pronounced differences across bilateral donors in targeting poor countries: 
                                              
14  Per-capita income in China even exceeded the median in 1999–2002. 
15    This may be due, at least partly, to country-specific aid commitments extending over 
several years. Medium-term commitments involve a trade-off between the predictability of 
project and program financing available to recipients and the possibility of donors to react 
flexibly to changing conditions.  
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•  The United States stands out in that the poorest quartile received considerably less 
than a quarter of US aid throughout the period under consideration. Moreover, the 
next quartile with absolute poverty just above the median was also discriminated 
against in the allocation of US aid. This corresponds to the widely held view that 
the developmental orientation of US aid is particularly weak.
16 
•  The calculations for Japan support the earlier observation of a bias against the 
poorest countries even though aid was concentrated on countries with per-capita 
incomes below the median. 
•  On the other hand, bilateral aid by some donors was at least as targeted to 
recipients with relatively low per-capita income as multilateral aid. Apart from 
Scandinavian donors, this also applies to the United Kingdom. 
•  In 1999–2002, the focus on countries with high incidence of absolute poverty was 
strongest for UK and Danish aid, and weakest for US and French aid. Most 
bilateral donors have in common, however, that their aid was more focussed on 
countries with relatively low per-capita income than on countries with relatively 
high incidence of absolute poverty. This is true for the most recent past, too, which 
puts into question that donors have strongly reacted to the widely perceived need to 
fight absolute poverty by reallocating aid. 
As mentioned earlier, the distribution of aid in absolute terms is dominated by 
comparatively large countries. Hence, we complement the share analysis by 
                                              
16  For a qualification of this view, see McGillivray (2003: 28).  
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correlating aid in terms of per capita of the recipient countries’ population with the 
incidence of absolute poverty and per-capita income, respectively. In this exercise 
each country observation carries the same weight, which implies that the correlation 
coefficients may depend heavily on some outliers of typically very small countries 
receiving outstandingly high aid in per-capita terms. For instance, Cape Verde, Samoa 
and Tonga each received bilateral aid in the order of US$ 150 per annum in 1999–
2002, whereas the median of bilateral aid to all sample countries amounted to just US$ 
15.6. But outliers are not restricted to very small countries. In the case of US aid, Israel 
stands out with annual per-capita aid of US$ 116 in 1999–2002, compared to the 
median of US$ 1.5 for all recipients of US aid. 
Recipients often received outstandingly high per-capita aid even though they were 
fairly advanced economically. With a per-capita income of more than US$ 18000 in 
1999, Israel belonged to the richest sample countries. The per-capita income of several 
very small countries with outstandingly high per-capita aid significantly exceeded the 
median for the overall sample.
17 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the 
treatment of outliers is critical for assessing whether aid was targeted to poor 
countries. Typically, the correlation analysis provides stronger support to the 
proposition of targeted aid when results are based on (non-parametric) Spearman rank 
correlations, rather than Pearson correlations (Table 3 and Annex Table 2). 
                                              
17    For example, the per-capita income of Cape Verde, Samoa and Tonga ranged from 
US$ 4400 to US$ 5800 (1999); the median was US$ 3350.  
 
22
   
Table 3 —  Per-capita Aida and Per-capita Income of Recipient Countriesb: Correlation Resultsc 
 Pearson  correlations  Spearman rank correlations 
  1981–1986 1987–1992 1993–1998 1999–2002 1981–1986 1987–1992  1993–1998  1999–2000 
































Japan  –0.07 –0.11 –0.10 –0.01 –0.14 –0.14 –0.13  –0.08 
France –0.10  –0.15  –0.15*  –0.17* –0.21**  –0.33***  –0.23** –0.13 
Germany –0.04  –0.02  –0.28***  –0.30*** –0.19*  –0.25*** –0.54***  –0.49*** 
United Kingdom  –0.10  –0.06  –0.03 –0.04 –0.27***  –0.24***  –0.21**  –0.31*** 
Netherlands –0.16  –0.14  –0.13 –0.20**  –0.39***  –0.40***  –0.40***  –0.54*** 
Sweden –0.11  –0.11  –0.12  –0.19** –0.33***  –0.34***  –0.39*** –0.50*** 
Norway –0.11  –0.09  –0.17*  –0.24** –0.51***  –0.52***  –0.52*** –0.50*** 
Denmark –0.22**  –0.19**  –0.22**  –0.26*** –0.53*** –0.56*** –0.50***  –0.41*** 
Multilateral donors  –0.19*  –0.24**  –0.17* –0.05  –0.31***  –0.39***  –0.31***  –0.31*** 
aAnnual average in US$ per capita of the recipient countries’ population at the beginning of the respective period. – bPer-capita 
income in US$, in terms of PPP, at the beginning of the respective period. – c Number of observations ranges from 100 to 129; 
*** significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test); ** 5 percent level;  * 10 percent level. – dIn parentheses: excluding Israel. 
Source: OECD (2004); World Bank (2004). 
 
In particular for bilateral donors, Pearson correlation coefficients reported in Table 3 
often remain insignificant. The correlation even turns out to be positive in the case of 
the United States unless Israel is excluded from the sample. It is only for Denmark that 
countries with lower per-capita income have consistently received higher per-capita 
aid. Pearson correlations point to improved targeting of aid over time by some bilateral 
donors, notably Germany and Norway. 
Japan provides an exception in that parametric as well as non-parametric correlations 
do not reveal any significant relationship between the per-capita income of recipients  
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and per-capita aid. This corresponds to Japan’s unfavourable position in the ranking of 
bilateral donors with regard to the aid component of the so-called Commitment to 
Development index, presented by the Centre for Global Development (The Economist 
2003). However, our results do not support the taillight position of the United States in 
this ranking once the impact of outliers is reduced by applying Spearman rank 
correlations. 
More generally, the second panel of Table 3 underscores that the targeting of aid 
differs considerably across bilateral donors. Throughout the period 1981–2002, 
targeting proved to be fairly strong for Norway and Denmark. Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden have improved the targeting of per-capita aid since the early 
1990s and, thereby, caught up with the two Scandinavian donors just mentioned. It is 
mainly because Japan and France have failed to strengthen the poverty orientation of 
aid why multilateral aid continued to be targeted more strongly to countries with lower 
per-capita income in 1999–2002 than bilateral aid of all donors taken together. Yet our 
correlation results cast further into doubt that multilateral aid has increasingly been 
directed to countries with low per-capita income. 
The comparison between multilateral and bilateral donors turns in favour of the latter 
if the poverty orientation of aid is measured by the incidence of absolute poverty in 
recipient countries (Annex table 2).
18 Multilateral institutions and most bilateral donors 
have in common, however, that the focus on countries with high incidence of absolute 
                                              
18  As concerns the comparison between individual bilateral donors, the results presented in 
Annex Table 2 are largely in line with the pattern observed in Table 3.  
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poverty lost momentum in 1999–2002, compared to 1993–1998. As a result, the 
Spearman rank correlation between per-capita aid and absolute poverty for the period 
1999–2002 (in Annex Table 2) is typically weaker than the corresponding correlation 
between per-capita aid and per-capita income of recipient countries (in Table 3). This 
finding renders it still more questionable that the fight against absolute poverty has 
increasingly shaped the allocation of aid. 
Is Aid Concentrated in Countries with Good Policies? 
As indicated earlier, the donors’ allegation is not only that the allocation of aid has 
become more efficient through targeting poor countries. In addition the World Bank 
(2002: 29) reckons: “Financial assistance is being increasingly allocated to countries 
that have reasonably good policies and institutions – that is, the countries that can best 
use aid for poverty alleviation.”
19 For evaluating which countries offer promising local 
conditions for aid to be effective, the World Bank refers to its own Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA). 
The problem for outsiders to critically assess the justification of such claims is that 
comprehensive information on the CPIA is not made available by the World Bank. We 
draw on limited evidence presented in Collier and Dollar (2001), who classify more 
than 100 countries into five CPIA categories ranging from very good to very poor. No 
exact reference year is given by the authors, but it seems reasonable to assume that the 
                                              
19  This statement by the World Bank refers to official development assistance in general, not 
just to multilateral aid.  
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information provided refers to the late 1990s. We use this information in two ways in 
this section: (i) to calculate the share of aid that various donors direct to countries with 
good and very good policies (CPIA 4 and 5) and those with poor and very poor 
policies (CPIA 2 and 1), and (ii) to assess whether aid inflows per capita of the 
recipients’ population are higher for the first group than for the second group. 
The evidence presented in Table 4 does not support the proposition of a well targeted 
allocation of aid. The CPIA is rated good or very good for 44 countries out of the 
overall sample of 96 developing countries for which both aid inflows and the CPIA are 
available. Hence the share of aid granted to this group should clearly exceed 50 
percent if it consisted of strongly preferred recipients of aid. However, multilateral 
institutions as well as several bilateral donors failed to meet this criterion in 1999–
2002: 
•  Among bilateral donors, the share is shown to be highest for the United States and 
Japan. This may come as a surprise in the light of the unfavourable rating these 
donors receive with regard to the aid component of the Commitment to 
Development index presented by the Centre for Global Development (The 
Economist 2003). In the case of Japan, this result is because of the strong focus of 
aid on some Asian neighbours whose policies are rated favourably; the share of 
China, India, the Philippines and Thailand amounted to one third of Japanese aid, 
compared to 15 percent of aid by all DAC donors taken together. In the case of the 
United States, one may argue that the three largest recipients in the CPIA 4/5 group 
(Egypt, Colombia and Jordan, which together accounted for 31 percent of US aid to  
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all developing countries for which the CPIA classification is available) would have 
been preferred recipients even if their policies had been rated less favourably, as 
they were considered strategically or politically important. 
•  The share of the CPIA 4/5 group is lowest for aid by Scandinavian countries and 
the Netherlands, which is in sharp contrast to the targeting of poor countries 
discussed in the previous section and puts into question the conventional wisdom 
that the developmental orientation of these donors is strongest. The Netherlands 
actually reported the highest share of aid directed to countries with poor and very 
poor policies (26 percent in 1999–2002). This is mainly because its former colony 
Indonesia became the most important recipient of Dutch aid after the outbreak of 
the Asian financial and currency crisis, even though the World Bank considered the 
policy and institutional environment in Indonesia to be poor. 
•  Furthermore, the evidence is in conflict with the World Bank’s claim that 
multilateral institutions focus their aid more strongly on countries with good 
policies than bilateral donors, who are said to be more “constrained … by 
geopolitical objectives” (World Bank 2002: 32) when deciding on the allocation of 
aid. 
Changes over time in the policy orientation of aid donors are difficult to assess as long 
as just one observation is available for the CPIA. The comparison of the aid share of 
countries with a CPIA of 4 or 5 in 1999–2002 with their share in 1993–1998 may be 
distorted due to unknown changes in the CPIA. Yet, it is striking that the aid share of 
the CPIA 4/5 group declined for almost all donors (with the notable exception of  
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France). This could be attributed to a bias against the donors’ allegation of an 
improved allocation over time if major recipients were characterized by better policies 
and institutional conditions in the late 1990s than in earlier years. The share of the 
CPIA 4/5 group reported in Table 4 for the period 1993–1998 would then be 
overstated, which would imply that we portray an overly bleak picture on changes over 
time in the policy orientation of donors. However, we consider such a bias unlikely in  
 
Table  4  —  Distribution of Aid According to Policy Conditions in Recipient Countries 
(percent)a 
  Share of aid directed to countries with: 
  CPIA 4/5  CPIA 1/2 
 1993–1998  1999–2002  1993–1998  1999–2002 
All DAC donors  55.5  50.1  22.0  21.9 
United States  67.7  55.9  21.6  23.2 
Japan 63.5  55.0  22.8  23.4 
France 46.8  51.7  23.1  16.3 
Germany 58.1  54.3  17.8  16.7 
United Kingdom  52.7  50.1  18.0  16.9 
Netherlands 51.4  39.6  11.9  26.2 
Sweden 47.0  43.2  14.6  17.0 
Norway 41.1  41.8  15.9  20.2 
Denmark 47.3  41.9  9.4  9.1 
Multilateral donors  49.2  47.5  20.4  20.5 
aAid to all developing countries for which the CPIA classification is available = 100. CPIA ranges 
from 5 (very good policies) to 1 (very poor policies); for details, see text. 




   
the light of deteriorating institutional conditions that Kaufmann et al. (2003) report for 
most developing countries. For all three institutional dimensions discussed in more 
detail further below, i.e., voice and accountability, rule of law and control of 
corruption, the number of developing countries with improvements in the period 
1996–2002 turns out to be significantly less than the number of countries with 
deteriorating institutional conditions. 
Similar to the procedure applied before, the impact of some large recipients on the 
policy orientation of aid may be reduced if aid is considered in per-capita terms, rather 
than absolute terms. The World Bank (2002: 32) uses the per-capita measure to prove 
that the allocation of aid has improved. As noted by Nunnenkamp (2002a), however, 
this measure may lead to seriously distorted results unless the treatment of outliers is 
made explicit. The average of per-capita aid may deviate substantially from the 
median since extremely small countries often receive outstandingly high per–capita aid 
inflows. If these countries are concentrated in either the good policy or the poor policy 
group, outliers can greatly affect the picture of the policy orientation of aid donors. 
Therefore, Table 5 not only reports the average per-capita aid granted to countries with 
different CPIA ratings, but also the corresponding median. The impact of outliers with 
particularly high per-capita aid is reflected in that the median always is substantially 
below the average. This discrepancy is typically larger for the group of countries with 
good and very good policies (CPIA 4/5). In other words, outliers are concentrated in 
this group so that average aid flows tend to overstate the policy orientation of donors.  
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Table  5  —  Per-capita Aid in 1999–2002 and Policy Conditions in Recipient Countries 
(US$)a 
  CPIA 4/5  CPIA 1/2 
 Median  Average  Median  Average 
All DAC donors  11.55  21.69  13.60  21.18 
United States  1.12  3.31  1.54  2.52 
Japan 2.19  6.93  1.67  3.96 
France 0.30  1.93  0.67  3.30 
Germany 0.76  1.92  0.67  0.86 
United Kingdom  0.25  1.30  0.10  0.70 
Netherlands 0.29  0.93  0.27  0.69 
Sweden 0.05  0.47  0.06  0.38 
Norway 0.07  0.35  0.13  0.30 
Denmark 0.06  0.43  0.01  0.15 
Multilateral donors  3.77  17.70  10.25  13.22 
aCPIA ranges from 5 (very good policies) to 1 (very poor policies); for details, see text. 
Source: OECD (2004); World Bank (2004); Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3). 
This applies to multilateral institutions in particular. Comparing average aid granted to 
countries in the CPIA 4/5 group and countries in the CPIA 1/2 group seems to validate 
claims that multilateral institutions preferred the former over the latter. However, this 
preference is only because the CPIA 4/5 group comprises five countries with a 
population of substantially less than one million and outstandingly high per-capita aid 
inflows (in descending order of aid in 1999–2002: St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Cape 
Verde, Guyana, and the Maldives). If these five recipients were excluded, the average 
reported for the CPIA 4/5 group would fall from US$ 17.7 to US$ 7.5. This adjustment 
underlines the impression to be gained from comparing the median, namely that 
countries with good policies were treated less favourably by multilateral institutions.  
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A similar picture is shown for all bilateral donors taken together, although the median 
suggests that bilateral donors discriminated less severely against recipients with good 
policies than multilateral institutions. For some bilateral donors, the median of aid 
granted to countries in the CPIA 4/5 group exceeded the median of aid granted to 
countries in the CPIA 1/2 group, as one would expect if donors favoured recipients 
with development-friendly policies. Japan, the United Kingdom and Denmark 
represent notable examples. The case of Denmark raises a puzzle: 
•  There is some evidence pointing to a relatively selective distribution of Danish aid 
compared to other bilateral donors. Denmark appears to be most reluctant to 
provide aid to countries with unfavourable policies; in 1999–2002, 12 out of 31 
countries with a CPIA of 1 or 2 did not receive any Danish aid (or repayments of 
earlier loans even resulted in negative net disbursements). 
•  This finding seems to conflict with the earlier result, reported in Table 4 above, of 
a relatively low share of Danish aid channelled to the CPIA 4/5 group. 
The ambiguity with regard to Denmark can be attributed to the prominent role of some 
poor countries with a CPIA of 3 (“moderate”) as recipients of Danish aid. Three 
countries out of the four most important recipients in 1999–2002 belong to this 
category: Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam, which together accounted for 26 
percent of Danish aid to all developing countries for which the CPIA classification is  
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available.
20 This invites the next step of our analysis in which we evaluate the 
allocation of aid by considering the income status of recipient countries in combination 
with the policy and institutional conditions prevailing in these countries. 
Do Poor Countries with Better Policies and Institutions Receive More Aid? 
In the following, we assess whether donors discriminate between more favourable and 
less favourable policy and institutional conditions within groups of recipient countries 
with similarly high per-capita income. For a start, we replicate the results of Table 5 
for sub-samples of relatively poor recipient countries. We restrict the sample by 
applying two alternative thresholds of per-capita income, US$ 4000 and US$ 2000 
(Table 6).
21 This reduces the number of countries with a CPIA of 4 or 5 from 44 
countries to 20 and 8 countries, respectively, whereas the number of countries with a 
CPIA of 1 or 2 is only reduced from 31 countries to 27 and 21 countries, respectively. 
In other words, aid recipients with better policies are concentrated in the higher 
income categories. 
                                              
20  Another 16 percent is accounted for by Burkina Faso, Malawi, Nicaragua and Zambia, 
which were also characterized by a CPIA of 3 and a relatively low per-capita income in 
1999. 




   
Table 6 —  Per-capita Income, Policy Conditions and Aid Inflows in 1999–2002 (Median; 
US$)a 
  Per-capita income in 1999: 
  Below US$ 4000  Below US$ 2000 








All DAC donors  18.86  13.60  19.85  13.60 
United States  2.98  1.60  2.98  1.60 
Japan 3.07  1.61  2.43  1.22 
France 0.22  0.67  0.26  0.86 
Germany 1.30  0.78  1.61  0.90 
United Kingdom  0.40  0.17  0.49  0.20 
Netherlands 0.46  0.34  0.88  0.35 
Sweden 0.09  0.07  0.16  0.22 
Norway 0.16  0.13  0.17  0.16 
Denmark 0.24  0.01  0.24  0.01 
Multilateral donors  8.05  11.10  12.03  11.89 
aCPIA ranges from 5 (very good policies) to 1 (very poor policies); for details, see text. 
Source:  OECD (2004); World Bank (2004); Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3). 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the median for the CPIA 4/5 group in 
Table 6 deviates more strongly from the median of the unrestricted sample in Table 5 
than the median for the CPIA 1/2 group. With few exceptions, the median of per-
capita aid increases when the calculation is restricted to recipients with lower per-
capita income. This confirms that most donors grant more aid to poorer countries. In 
line with evidence presented in preceding sections, Japan and France are notable 
exceptions: Japan provided less aid to poor countries with a CPIA of 1 or 2 than to all  
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countries in that CPIA group; the median of French aid in 1999–2002 turns out to be 
lower for the restricted sample with a CPIA of 4 or 5. 
At the same time, French aid remains biased against countries with better policies if 
we control for per-capita income of the recipients. This result may be attributed to 
close post-colonial ties of France with poor performers in Sub-Saharan Africa. More 
surprisingly perhaps, a similar bias can be observed for Sweden when the sample is 
restricted to countries with per-capita income below US$ 2000. This may be in conflict 
with conventional wisdom, but underscores the earlier finding of Schraeder et al. 
(1998) that the allocation of Swedish aid left much to be desired. By contrast, the 
distribution of US aid and Norwegian aid is no longer biased against recipients with 
better policies. Once again the policy orientation of Danish aid appears to be strongest 
in Table 6. The United Kingdom ranks second in terms of targeting aid to poor 
recipients with better policies. The United States, Japan and Germany granted about 
twice as much aid to poor countries with better policies, independently of whether the 
income threshold is set at US$ 4000 or US$ 2000. 
The differences in the policy orientation of individual bilateral donors have as a 
consequence that the median of aid is just about US$ 5-6 higher for poor countries 
with better policies if all bilateral donors are taken together. Compared to multilateral 
donor institutions, however, Table 6 points to a relatively strong policy orientation of 
bilateral donors. This result contrasts sharply with the World Bank’s assertion that 
multilateral institutions are less constrained by geopolitical objectives (World Bank 
2002: 32). As a matter of fact, the distribution of multilateral aid remains biased  
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against countries with a CPIA of 4 or 5 if countries with per-capita income below US$ 
4000 are considered. This discrimination disappears only if the sample is further 
restricted to countries with per-capita income below US$ 2000; but even then poor 
countries with better policies did not receive significantly more aid from multilateral 
institutions than poor countries whose policies are rated poor or very poor. 
In contrast to the limited information that is publicly available with respect to the 
World Bank’s CPIA, Kaufmann et al. (2003) offer a wealth of information on the 
institutional conditions prevailing in a large number of countries.
22 Two out of the six 
institutional indicators presented in this widely used source, namely control of 
corruption and the rule of law, are of particular interest for assessing in more detail 
whether aid donors preferred recipient countries in which the institutional framework 
rendered it more likely that external aid could be used productively. A third indicator, 
voice and accountability, is considered in the following to check whether donors 
granted more aid to countries where democratic values appear to be more advanced. 
Each indicator ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
institutional conditions. In this section, we use the indicator values presented for 2000 
in Kaufmann et al. (2003), reflecting the stage of institutional development across 
developing countries at that time. 
In addition to these institutional indicators, two policy-related variables are considered 
in the following: (i) annual average consumer price inflation in 1999-2002 is taken as a 
                                              
22  Harms and Lutz (2004: 21) stress the advantages of the data set presented by Kaufmann et 




   
proxy of macroeconomic stability in recipient countries; (ii) the share of exports plus 
imports in GDP of recipient countries in 1999–2002 is supposed to reflect their 
openness to trade. Conventional wisdom suggests that aid can be used more 
productively in countries that are macro-economically stable and more open to trade. 
Hence, aid should be related negatively with inflation, and positively with the trade 
share if donors took these policy-related variables into account when deciding on the 
allocation of aid. 
The relevance of the five institutional and policy-related indicators for the distribution 
of bilateral and multilateral aid in 1999–2002 is assessed by applying correlation 
analysis. We calculate Spearman rank correlation coefficients, rather than parametric 
correlation coefficients, since the institutional indicators by definition have a limited 
variation. All correlations are calculated for the restricted sample of developing 
countries with per-capita income below US$ 4000 in 1999. This is not only because of 
the focus on relatively poor developing countries in this section. At the same time, this 
restriction, which reduces the number of observations to 64-74, seems required to 
avoid seriously biased results, taking into account that more advanced countries are 
typically characterized by better institutions. 
Most of the correlations of per-capita aid in 1999–2002 with institutional indicator 
values in 2000 turn out to be insignificant (Table 7: columns 1–3). The interpretation 
of this finding is ambiguous, however. Even though we restrict the sample as indicated 
above, all three institutional indicators are still positively related with the per-capita 
income of aid recipients (these correlations are not shown). As a consequence, we may  
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understate the relevance of institutional conditions for the allocation of aid. The 
coefficients reported in Table 7 (columns 1–3) tend to capture two opposing effects: 
On the one hand better institutional conditions may encourage higher aid ceteris 
paribus; on the other hand donors tend to allocate less aid to countries that are 
economically more advanced and, thus, have better institutions. 
Yet one can get some tentative clues as concerns the reaction of donors to institutional 
conditions in recipient countries. First, institutional conditions appear to have been 
more relevant for Japanese aid than for aid from other bilateral donors. This may be a 
side effect of Japan’s low engagement in least developed countries (see above) and its 
focus on Asian neighbours with more advanced institutions. Second, bilateral donors 
seem to be less concerned about legal conditions and corruption than about democratic 
values and political institutions, proxied by voice and accountability. The observation 
that all correlations between bilateral aid and control of corruption are insignificant is 
in line with the earlier finding of Alesina and Weder (2002: 1136), who conclude: 
“There is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid.” Third, 
in contrast to Alesina and Weder (2002) who did not find systematic differences 
between bilateral and multilateral donors in 1975–1995, the correlation results for aid 





   
Table  7  —  Per-capita Aid and Institutional Conditions in Low-income Recipient 
Countriesa: Correlation Resultsb 
  Aid in 1999–2002 with:  Difference of aid (1999–2002 vs. 
1993–1998) with difference (2002 
vs. 1996) of: 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 voice  and 
accounta-
bility (2000) 








rule of law  control of 
corruption 
All DAC donors  0.40***  0.19  0.18  0.19*  0.06  0.14 
United States  0.19*  0.01  0.04  0.19*  –0.05  –0.01 
Japan 0.36***  0.26**  0.03  0.19  0.01  –0.07 
France  0.01  0.01  0.06 –0.03 –0.13  0.04 
Germany 0.18  0.15  0.16  0.21*  0.11  0.12 
United Kingdom  0.10  0.19*  0.13  0.15  0.08  0.02 
Netherlands  0.15  0.03 –0.01  0.11 –0.05 –0.11 
Sweden –0.06  –0.06  –0.00  0.13  –0.15  0.14 
Norway  0.03  0.01  -0.11 0.01  –0.11 0.08 
Denmark 0.31***  0.16  0.16  –0.06  0.01  0.05 
         
Multilateral donors  0.28**  0.06 0.27**  0.31***  0.00 0.04 
aPer-capita income in 1999 below US$ 4000 (PPP). – bSpearman rank correlation coefficients; *** 
significant at 1 percent level (two-tailed test), ** 5 percent level, * 10 percent level. Number of 
observations: 74 for correlations with voice and accountability, rule of law, control of corruption, as 
well as the difference of voice and accountability; 70 for correlations with the difference of the rule of 
law; 62 for correlations with the difference of control of corruption. 
Source: OECD (2004); Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
 
As concerns macroeconomic stability and openness to trade, the behaviour of 
multilateral institutions did not differ significantly from the behaviour of all bilateral  
donors taken together. Similar to the findings on the relevance of institutional 
conditions, most of the correlation coefficients presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
8 are insignificant. Some bilateral donors granted even higher aid to countries  
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characterized by high inflation. More open countries appear to have received more aid 
from bilateral and multilateral donors. However, this finding would probably turn out 
to be superficial if country-size effects were taken into account: Relatively small 
countries, which tend to receive higher per-capita aid than large countries, are typically 
characterized by a relatively high share of external trade in GDP. 
Do Donors Respond to Changes in Institutional and Policy Conditions? 
In this section, we redefine the institutional and policy-related variables, as well as the 
aid variable, in order to overcome some of the limitations of the previous step of our 
analysis. The possibility that the relevance of institutions has been understated so far 
may be checked by taking the difference between indicator values reported for 2002 
and those for 1996 as a measure of institutional changes. Unlike the indicator values 
for one particular year, institutional changes are not correlated with per-capita income 
of recipient countries. Positive differences reveal institutional improvements and 
should be associated with an increase in per-capita aid. Changes in aid are defined as 
the difference between per-capita aid in 1999–2002 and per-capita aid in 1993–1998. 
Likewise, macroeconomic variables are redefined as the difference in inflation and the 




   
Table 8 —  Per-capita Aid, Macroeconomic Stability and Openness to Trade in Low-income 
Recipient Countriesa: Correlation Resultsb 
  Aid in 1999–2002 with:  Difference of aid (1999–2002 vs. 
1993–1998) with: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 










All DAC donors  0.02  0.23*  –0.30**  0.06 
United States  0.16  0.19  –0.15  –0.10 
Japan 0.07  0.37***  –0.25*  0.16 
France –0.37***  –0.05  –0.19  –0.14 
Germany  –0.11 0.02  –0.18 0.11 
United  Kingdom  0.24* 0.04 –0.25* 0.02 
Netherlands  0.19 –0.03 –0.18  0.17 
Sweden 0.22*  0.06  –0.01  0.03 
Norway 0.29**  0.02  –0.15  –0.08 
Denmark  0.15 –0.03 –0.17  0.10 
      
Multilateral  donors  –0.08 0.29**  –0.03 0.14 
aPer-capita income in 1999 below US$ 4000 (PPP). – bSpearman rank correlation coefficients; *** 
significant at 1 percent level (two-tailed test), ** 5 percent level, * 10 percent level. Number of 
observations: 72 for correlations with openness to trade and change in openness; 64 (61) for 
correlations with inflation (change in inflation). – cAnnual average of consumer price inflation. – 
dAnnual average of the percentage share of the sum of exports and imports in GDP. – e1999–2002 
minus 1993–1998. 
Source: OECD (2004); World Bank (2004). 
 
In Table 9 we exemplify the reaction of aid donors to particularly pronounced changes 
in institutional conditions in selected recipient countries with low per-capita income. 
We present three cases for which institutional conditions with regard to voice and 
accountability, rule of law and control of corruption improved significantly as well as 
three cases for which institutional conditions deteriorated most seriously. With the 
exception of Haiti, the countries considered are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is  
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because low-income countries with pronounced changes in institutional conditions are 
concentrated in this region. 
Table 9  —  Change of Per-capita Aida to Selected Recipients with Significant Institutional 
Changesb 
  Improvement of:  Deterioration of: 



























All DAC donors  +  –  –  – – – 
United  States  + 0 + – – 0 
Japan +  –  –  0  +  – 
France 0  –  –  – – – 
Germany 0  –  –  – – – 
United Kingdom  +  0  –  – – + 
Netherlands 0  –  –  0 – + 
Sweden 0  0  –  – – 0 
Norway 0  –  –  +  – – 
Denmark 0  –  –  0 – + 
        
Multilateral donors  –  + + – – – 
aDifference between per-capita aid granted in 1999–2002 and that granted in 1993–1998; “0” if the 
difference, in absolute terms, is not higher than US$ 0.01 or below 10 percent. – bDifference 
between institutional indicator values reported for 2002 and those reported for 1996; see numbers in 
parentheses for selected recipients. 
Source: OECD (2004); Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
 
The proposition that the allocation of aid has become more efficient implies that 
institutional improvements went along with increased aid (“+” in Table 9), whereas 
deteriorating institutional conditions should have been associated with reduced aid   
(“–“). However, a large number of entries in Table 9 is in conflict with this  
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proposition. Less than half of all entries (30 out of 66) point to an efficient reallocation 
of aid in response to institutional changes. One third of all entries (shaded cells) 
suggest that donors reacted inappropriately to such changes, and another 14 entries 
indicate just marginal changes in aid (“0” ). More specifically, the country episodes 
may be summarized as follows: 
•  The reaction of donors to institutional improvements is shown to be particularly 
deficient. In 26 out of 33 cases, aid did not respond or even declined. 
Madagascar was not rewarded by increased bilateral aid although it made 
considerable progress in enforcing the rule of law. Ethiopia did not benefit from 
higher bilateral aid, except from the United States, in response to better control 
of corruption. 
•  The reaction to deteriorating institutional conditions turns out to be more 
appropriate, even though aid increased in some instances. All donors except 
Japan reacted strongly by cutting aid to Zimbabwe where the rule of law was 
seriously compromised. 
•  Among the three institutional aspects under consideration, it was especially 
with regard to control of corruption that bilateral donors did not react as 
strongly as one might have expected, in the light of the strong views the 
development community holds on the detrimental effects of corruption.
23 
Rather, the episodes of Ethiopia and Côte d’Ivoire add further evidence to the 
                                              
23  For example, Weder (2000: 293) argues that “corruption is one of the most important 
obstacles to development.”  
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earlier findings of Alesina and Weder (2002). Comparing the ratio of 
“appropriate” to “inappropriate” reactions in Table 9, bilateral donors seem to 
be more concerned about democratisation in recipient countries, reflected in 
changes for voice and accountability, than about corruption and the rule of law. 
•  The reactions of multilateral institutions were similar to those of all bilateral 
donors taken together when institutional conditions deteriorated in recipient 
countries. Yet a somewhat different pattern emerges for multilateral 
institutions. They reacted more favourably to stricter enforcement of the rule of 
law in Madagascar and better control of corruption in Ethiopia. On the other 
hand, the comparison of bilateral and multilateral donors turns out to be in 
favour of the former when it comes to voice and accountability in Nigeria. 
•  Finally, there are some interesting differences between the reaction patterns of 
individual bilateral donors. In contrast to the taillight position of the United 
States in the ranking of the Centre for Global Development, the United States is 
the only bilateral donor for which none of the entries has a “wrong” sign. At the 
same time, three “wrong” signs each for the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark 
and Japan indicate that the allocation of aid leaves much to be desired even for 
donors whose aid was shown to be well targeted in some respects. 
In the light of the evidence discussed for particularly pronounced cases of institutional 
change, it is no longer surprising that there are very few statistically significant 
correlations between changes in institutional conditions and changes in per-capita aid 
(Table 7: columns 4–6). Hence, it is rather unlikely that the relevance of institutions  
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for the allocation of aid was seriously understated before. All four significant 
correlation coefficients relate to the same institutional aspect, voice and accountability. 
None of the major donors responded to changes concerning the rule of law and control 
of corruption in a way that would have improved the allocation of aid. 
The same applies to one of the two policy-related variables, namely the change in the 
trade-to-GDP ratio (Table 8: columns 3–4). In other words, neither bilateral nor 
multilateral donors systematically supported the process of opening up to trade of 
various developing countries by increasing aid to these countries. Multilateral 
institutions as well as many bilateral donors also failed to reward successful 
macroeconomic stabilization efforts, reflected in lower inflation in 1999–2002, by 
increasing aid. Taken together, the reactions of most major donors to changes in 
institutional and policy conditions proved to be fairly weak. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Multilateral institutions and most bilateral donors provide more aid to relatively poor 
countries. Yet we find little evidence supporting the view that foreign aid is well 
targeted (Table 10). The targeting of aid to low-income countries has become weaker, 
rather than stronger in recent years. Various donors, including multilateral institutions, 
were hesitant to adjust the allocation of aid to the changing income status of recipients. 
While the targeting of aid differs considerably across important bilateral donors, it is 
highly questionable that the fight against absolute poverty has increasingly shaped the 
allocation of aid.  
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Table 10 —  Summary of Resultsa 













All DAC donors  0  –    0  (+)  0 
United States  0  0    0  (+)  0 
Japan –  0    +  (+)  – 
France –  –    –  (–  –)  – 
Germany +  0    0  (+)  0 
United Kingdom  ++  0    0  (++)  0 
Netherlands ++ –    0  (+)  – 
Sweden ++  –    –  (–)  – 
Norway ++  –    –  (0)  – 
Denmark ++  0    0  (++)  – 
        
Multilateral donors  +  –    0  (–)  0 
aAssessment refers mainly to aid allocation in 1999–2002; strong: ++, moderate: +, ambiguous: 0, 
weak: -, very weak: --. – bIn parentheses: based on CPIA exclusively (Table 6). 
 
Furthermore, the distribution of aid across all developing countries is in serious 
conflict with the proposition that aid has been granted predominantly to where the 
institutional and policy framework rendered it more likely that aid could be used 
productively. Judging local conditions in recipient countries by the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), two findings stand out: 
•  Once we adjust for some outliers, it turns out that recipients with good policies 
were often treated less favourably. The World Bank’s claim that multilateral aid 
has a stronger policy orientation than bilateral aid is rejected.  
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•  The widely held belief that Scandinavian donors and the Netherlands provide 
more efficient aid, particularly compared to Japan and the United States, 
ignores that at least some of the allegedly superior donors discriminate against 
recipients with a favourable CPIA. 
Aid by some bilateral donors (notably France, but also Sweden) remains biased against 
countries with better local conditions even if the sample of recipients is restricted to 
poor countries. In the case of France, this result might have been expected because of 
close post-colonial ties between France and poor performers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The case of Sweden may be more surprising, even though an earlier investigation 
came to a similar result (Schraeder et al. 1998). At the same time, the finding that 
multilateral institutions did not have a stronger policy orientation proves to be robust if 
we control for the income status of recipients, and if we complement the CPIA by 
more specific institutional and policy-related indicators to assess the targeting towards 
poor countries with good local conditions for aid to be effective. The relation between 
aid and institutional as well as policy-related indicators turns out to be ambiguous. 
Bilateral donors appear to be less concerned about the rule of law and control of 
corruption in recipient countries than about democratic values and political institutions 
(“voice and accountability”). As concerns the relevance of policy-related indicators, 
some donors granted even higher aid to countries characterized by macroeconomic 
instability. 
Finally, the response of both, bilateral and multilateral donors to changing institutional 
and policy conditions in recipient countries proved to be disappointingly weak, in the  
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light of the widespread rhetoric that policy reforms and institutional development 
would be supported. Selected country episodes point to an efficient reallocation of aid 
in response to institutional changes for less than half of all observations. In that regard, 
especially the reaction patterns of allegedly superior donors such as Denmark, Norway 
and the Netherlands left much to be desired. According to cross-country correlations, 
none of the major donors responded to changes concerning the rule of law and control 
of corruption in a way that would have improved the allocation of aid; and donors 
have failed to systematically support the process of opening up to trade in developing 
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Annex Table 1 —  Share of Recipient Countries with High Incidence of Absolute Povertya in Total 
Aid by Bilateral and Multilateral Donors,b 1981–2002 (percent) 
Donors   Groups of recipients  1981–1986  1987–1992  1993–1998  1999–2002 
All DAC donors  poorest quartile  29.4  18.3  28.3  27.4 
  poor half  53.1  57.1  66.6  58.5 
United  States  poorest  quartile  11.2 15.3 21.8 18.9 
  poor half  30.9  31.8  44.2  39.1 
Japan  poorest  quartile  37.6 10.3 18.8 18.8 
  poor half  52.8  58.4  75.1  57.0 
France  poorest  quartile  31.2 17.8 23.3 16.4 
  poor half  49.1  52.3  51.4  47.5 
Germany  poorest  quartile  33.5 20.1 29.3 25.4 
  poor half  54.0  52.6  66.4  62.0 
United  Kingdom  poorest  quartile  41.5 36.0 50.1 60.8 
  poor half  75.8  85.5  82.1  80.6 
Netherlands  poorest  quartile  44.1 25.9 43.0 41.5 
  poor half  75.5  75.3  67.3  66.1 
Sweden  poorest  quartile  48.8 29.5 50.0 43.8 
  poor half  89.9  86.9  77.7  77.0 
Norway  poorest  quartile  41.0 36.8 58.2 45.8 
  poor half  88.8  89.1  84.2  73.3 
Denmark  poorest  quartile  44.8 39.7 59.6 55.6 
  poor half  85.8  85.7  83.5  81.8 
        
        
Multilateral  donors  poorest  quartile  48.3 30.0 37.3 37.5 
  poor half  76.0  79.1  73.0  66.7 
aCountry classification according to percentage of population living on less than US$ 1 per day at the beginning of the 
respective period. – bAid granted to all countries with data on incidence of absolute poverty in the respective period = 100. 
Aid reported as unallocated in the source not included in totals. 
 





   
Annex Table 2 —  Per-capita  Aida and Incidence of Absolute Poverty in Recipient Countriesb: 
Correlation Resultsc 
 Pearson  correlations  Spearman rank correlations 
  1981–1986 1987–1992 1993–1998 1999–2002 1981–1986 1987–1992 1993–1998 1999–2002 
All DAC donors  –0.07  0.06  0.25**  0.12 –0.01    0.13  0.39***  0.26** 
United  States  –0.18 –0.10 –0.01 –0.08 –0.04    0.14  0.29***  0.19* 
Japan –0.24**  –0.18  0.06  –0.00 –0.13 –0.03  0.26**  0.02 
France  0.17 0.18 0.18*  0.07 –0.09  0.16  0.21* 0.12 
Germany  –0.06 0.00 0.25**  0.12 –0.08  0.12  0.34***  0.28*** 
United  Kingdom  0.05 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.25**  0.32***  0.30*** 
Netherlands 0.07  0.26**  0.25** 0.20*  0.12  0.33***  0.32***  0.38*** 
Sweden  0.09 0.17 0.27**  0.24** 0.09  0.02  0.28** 0.31*** 
Norway 0.07  0.15  0.38***  0.31*** 0.25**  0.43*** 0.57*** 0.36*** 
Denmark 0.14  0.23*  0.47***  0.42*** 0.33*** 0.48*** 0.53*** 0.38*** 
Multilateral donors  0.11  0.28**  0.21* 0.04  0.24**  0.40***  0.32***  0.20* 
aAnnual average in US$ per capita of the recipient countries’ population at the beginning of the respective period. – 
bPercentage of the recipient countries’ population living on less than US$ 1 per day. – cNumber of observations ranges from 
70 to 84; *** significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed  test); ** 5 percent level;  * 10 percent level. 
Source:  OECD (2004); Collier and Dollar (2001: Table 3); online data base on poverty 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp) 
 
 